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Realiteit van waardes in die etiek van Nicolai Hartmann

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dc.contributor.author Van Wyk GJC en
dc.date.accessioned 2016-09-22T11:54:33Z
dc.date.available 2016-09-22T11:54:33Z
dc.date.submitted 1970 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11892/142044
dc.description.abstract This study critically analyses, and rejects, Nicolai Hartmann's theory that values are entities which are capable of intuitive experience, exist independently of people and determine the behaviour of people; this theory gives rise to contradictions, absurdities and endless regressions. Hartmann's methods lead to concepts wrongly being regarded as things and processes. In Hartmann's New Ontology all existing things are categorised or divided into real things, e.g. rocks, plants, etc. and idealistic things, e.g. fundamentals or values. Hartmann's doctrine of being moments as well as his modality doctrine which underlies this division, is critically analysed and rejected because it transgressed the rules for the meaningful application of certain concepts. The category doctrine of Hartmann is discussed and also rejected because it implies that things exist in categories of their own and by nature; anything or concept can be classified in different ways relative to the aim and standpoint of the classifier. Values do no exist independently of the person who does the valuing. Hartmann theorises that if an entity is recognisable, that is proof that entity exists; because values are recognised and can be described correctly, values must be existing entities. This argument falls away because the theory which on which it is grounded gives rise to contradictions, absurdities and endless regressions; it is not only existing entities which are capable of experiences that can be recognised. The ethic of Hartmann is also discussed in detail, and rejected as giving rise to absurdities. Hartmann's most important arguments for the existence of values as separate entities is systematically formulated, analysed and shown to be invalid. Values are not terms which refer to existing entities, but polymorphic, dispositional and abstract concepts which function in our descriptions of the actual doings of people who react in situations. en
dc.language Afrikaans en
dc.subject Philosophy en
dc.subject History en
dc.title Realiteit van waardes in die etiek van Nicolai Hartmann en
dc.title.alternative Reality of values in the ethics of Nicolai Hartmann en
dc.type Masters degree en
dc.description.degree MA en

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