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A cryptographically secure protocol for key exchanges

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dc.contributor.author Herdan DE en
dc.date.accessioned 2016-09-22T09:55:51Z
dc.date.available 2016-09-22T09:55:51Z
dc.date.created 1991 en
dc.date.submitted 1992 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11892/66129
dc.description.abstract Since the emergence of electronic communication, scientists have strived to make these communication systems as secure as possible. Classical cryptographical methods provided secrecy, with the proviso that the courier delivering the keys could be trusted. This method of key distribution proved to be too inefficient and costly. 'Cryptographical renaissance' was brought about with the advent of public key cryptography, in which the message key consists of a pair of mathematically complementary keys, instead of the symmetric keys of it's forerunner. Classical cryptographical techniques were by no means obsolete, as the idea of using 'hybrid' systems proved to be very effective, by using the tedious public key techniques to allow both parties to share a secret, and the more efficient symmetric algorithms to actually encrypt the message. New technology leads, however, to new difficulties and the problems of key management now arose. Various protocols started emerging as solutions to the key distribution problem, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. The aim of this work is to critically review these protocols, analyse the shortfalls and attempt to design a protocol which will overcome these shortfalls. The class of protocol reviewed are the so-called 'strong authentication' protocols, whereby interaction between the message sender and recipient is required. en
dc.language English en
dc.subject Mathematics, Mathematical statistics and Statistics en
dc.subject Numerical analysis and computer methods en
dc.title A cryptographically secure protocol for key exchanges en
dc.type Masters degree en
dc.description.degree MSc en

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